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Abstract : 
The employees’ decision to become shareholder of the company they work for can be a 
consequence of employers’ matching contribution in company stock. From a behavioral 
perspective, employees would regard these contributions as an implicit investment advice 
made by their employer. This paper adopts another viewpoint. Since employee ownership can 
be used as an entrenchment mechanism, we suggest that employer’s matching policy can be 
considered as an imperfect signal of management quality. This paper suggests that employee 
ownership can be used by managers to compensate their management skills to the market. It 
recommends that employee ownership policy should not be influenced by the managers. 
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1. Introduction 
There are conflicting arguments regarding employee stock ownership in the academic 
literature. On one hand, employee ownership would enhance corporate performance through 
its incentive effects. Moreover, Weitzman (1984) argued that profit sharing mechanism could 
solve stagflation. On another hand, it would result in poor corporate governance due to the 
potential collusion between employee owners and management. Indeed, Blasi (1988, p. xi) 
remarked that employee ownership could be regarded as a revolution or a rip-off. From his 
point, employee ownership could be regarded as a revolution when it improves corporate 
performance and lead to a better workplace’s satisfaction. But it could lead to a rip-off when it 
is used as a management entrenchment mechanism.  
These conflicting points lead us to investigate management’s motivations to offer 
company stock to employees. Benartzi (2001) argues that employees tend to consider 
management matching contribution in company stock as an implicit investment advice. He 
calls this phenomenon the “endorsement effect” and regards it as primarily behavioral. This 
paper rather regards matching contribution in company stock as a signal of management 
quality. From this standpoint, by choosing the level of company stock granted to employees, 
management would signal their type to the market. Good managers would use employee 
ownership as an incentive mechanism while bad managers would use it as an entrenchment 
mechanism.  
We emphasize three main results. Firstly, we show that bad managers wish to appear 
as good ones by using employee ownership as an imperfect signal of their management 
quality. Secondly, good managers must offer higher level of employee ownership to signal 
themselves because of the presence of bad managers. Due to this phenomenon, bad managers 
have an incentive to appear as good managers, but also, good managers have an incentive to 
appear as bad. Thirdly, introducing prior commitments by the managers could solve this 
problem. From a managerial perspective, this paper suggests that employee ownership can be 
used by managers to compensate their management skills to the market. It recommends that 
employee ownership policy should defined by the board of directors before the manager is 
hired.  
This paper proposes a sequential game where a risk neutral manager grants company 
stock to his risk averse employee. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 analyzes the literature on employee ownership incentive effects and its implication for 
corporate governance. Section 3 presents the model set-up. Section 4 develops the conditions 
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of the optimal contracting. Section 5 presents comparative statics analyses. Section 6 offers 
concluding remarks. All proofs are presented in the appendix. 
 
2. Literature 
A first body of literature on employee stock ownership focused on its positive effects on 
employees’ behavior. These researches tested how employee ownership affects work attitudes 
such as implication, involvement, satisfaction, turnover and turnover intention. Klein (1987) 
identified three perspectives to explain the effects of employee stock ownership on 
employees’ behavior: − intrinsic, − instrumental, − extrinsic. The first perspective is the 
intrinsic satisfaction. It states that employee ownership per se can increase employees’ 
commitment to the organization and its satisfaction. Empirical results gave a little support to 
this model. The second perspective is the instrumental satisfaction. It states that the employee 
owner satisfaction and commitment come from the participation in decision-making. 
Empirical tests assessed the relationship between employee ownership and perceived 
employees’ influence in decision-making and linked these perceptions with employees’ 
attitudes. The results of empirical studies support this model (Long, 1978; Long, 1980, Klein, 
1987; Klein et al, 1988; French and Rosenstein, 1984; Buchko, 1992a, 1992b, 1993; 
Pendleton et al, 1998; Pendleton, 2001). The third perspective is the extrinsic satisfaction. It 
states that employee stock ownership is motivating when it is financially rewarding. Most of 
the empirical literature suggests that this model could explain employee owners’ positive 
attitudes (French, 1987; Klein, 1987; Rosen et al, 1986; Buchko 1992b, 1993; Gamble et al, 
1999). Klein concluded this model is in line with the conclusions of the Principal-Agent 
Model. Since employee stock ownership is a way to motivate employees, it has effects on 
corporate performance. In the literature, performance is measured in terms of productivity and 
profitability. Kruse and Blasi (1997) reviewed all the empirical tests of employee stock 
ownership on performance. To sum up all the findings available, Kruse (2002) states that 
empirical literature considers employee stock ownership as having either a positive or null 
effects on performance.  
Another body of literature on employee stock ownership focused on its negative effects on 
corporate governance. Employee stock ownership is often regarded as a powerful anti-
takeover tool since it reduces the probability that a takeover arises (Shivdasani, 1993; Beatty, 
1995). From this standpoint, management would use employee ownership to put shares of the 
company in “friendly hands” (Benartzi et al, 2007). The argument is that collusion between 
management and employee owners is possible. Pagano and Volpin (2005) states that:  
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“managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats” (p. 841). They conclude 
that: “managers offer long-term contracts to guard against raiders, and workers are willing to 
take action to protect their high wages” (p. 864). Employee ownership would serve as a 
management entrenchment mechanism. Gordon and Pound (1990) argue that many employee 
ownership plans were established in the US during the late 1980s explicitly to defend against 
takeovers. When an employee stock ownership plan is implemented, event studies report 
negative reaction of the financial markets in line with the management entrenchment 
hypothesis (Chang, 1990; Chang and Mayers, 1992; Conte et al, 1996). As a takeover 
defence, employee ownership could even be more powerful than poison pills or golden 
parachutes (Chaplinsky and Niehaus, 1994). Poison pills and golden parachutes are less used 
when an employee stock ownership plans is implemented (Park and Song, 1995). Rauh (2006) 
confirms that employee ownership has a deterrence effect on takeover probabilities. He 
further claims that: “Strategic corporate control motives are, therefore, one significant reason 
managers encourage employees to hold company stock in their defined contribution pension 
accounts. As laws grant managers more insulation from market discipline, the incentive for 
management to encourage employees to hold company stock decreases.” Brown et al (2006) 
find that offering matching contribution in company stock in 401(k) plans is more likely when 
they do not have multiple classes of stock which is an alternative mechanism to reduce 
takeover threats. According to them, employee ownership can then be interpreted as a mean to 
put shares in friendly hands to thwart takeovers. 
According to the literature, employee ownership has therefore two sides: a bright one 
involving a better corporate performance and a dark side leading to management 
entrenchment. These arguments can be both regarded as management’s motives to stimulate 
employee ownership. In several countries such as the US, management encourages employee 
ownership through matching contributions in company stock or discount on stock prize. Even 
if Brown et al (2006) show that firms tend to take into account the effect of their matching 
policy on participant retirement security, it is unclear whether workers take advantage of 
holding their company stock. Meulbroek (2005) and Ramaswamy (2003) estimate that the 
cost of investing in employer’s stock is prohibitive. Since employee owners’ saving strategy 
seems to be irrational, financial economists investigated behavioral biases (see Benartzi et al 
(2007) for a review). Along with other cognitive biases, Benartzi (2001) finds that: “when the 
employer’s contributions are automatically directed to company stock, employees invest more 
of their own contributions in company stock (p. 1748)”. According to him this phenomenon is 
consistent with an “endorsement effect: employees interpret the allocation of the employer’s 
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contributions as implicit investment advice (p. 1748)”. Purcell (2003) confirms this effect 
using archival data by emphasizing that 401(k) concentration in company stock is 
significantly higher in companies where matching contributions are offered in company stock.  
Our paper is an attempt to investigate an alternative explanation of employees’ response to 
their employer’s policy regarding company stock. We suggest that granting company stock to 
employees can be interpreted as an imperfect signal on management quality. 
 
3. The model 
Consider a model with three stages involving a risk neutral entrepreneur and a risk averse 
employee. This employee is representative of all company employees. We thus consider all 
employees to have homogeneous preferences. Figure 1 illustrates the time line. 
 
t=0 t=1 t=2 
   
The nature chooses the 
management’s type k={G,B}: good 
(G) with a probability p0 or bad (B) 
with a probability 1 – p0.  
The manager defines the level of 
employee ownership c granted to 
the employees (c ≥ 0). 
The employee observes the level of 
c and decides the level of effort 
implemented j={H,L}:  
high (H) or low (L). 
FIGURE 1: TIME LINE 
 
At t = 0, the nature chooses the manager’s quality. The type of the entrepreneur can either be 
good (G) or bad (B) with k={G,B}. The entrepreneur knows his type and the employee has an 
a priori probability distribution on it: P0, p0 = P0(G), 1 – p0 = P0(B), 0 < p0 < 1. 
At t = 1, the entrepreneur designs the compensation system aimed at motivating the employee 
to expand his desired level of effort. The compensation system we investigate only consists in 
employee ownership. We thus consider a setup where the entrepreneur has to decide whether 
or not to offer company stock to his employee and the amount of it. The entrepreneur’s wealth 
Wd is positive and totally invested in company stock. When employee ownership is offered to 
employee, it takes the form of a contribution in company stock that diminishes entrepreneur’s 
wealth. Suppose c to be a proportion of Ws, the positive initial employee’s wealth. cWs is the 
money value of company stock granted to employee. Indeed, the money value of the 
contribution granted to the employee is very often commensurate with the amount invested by 
the employee. For instance, it takes the form of a discount or a matching contribution. 
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Degeorge et al. (2004) confirmed empirically that wealthier employees are more willing to 
take a firm exposure.  
At t = 2, the employee observes the compensation system and chooses e, the level of effort 
that affects the stochastic part of the return on company stock r. The employee’s expected 
utility is supposed to be additively separable between the gains and the disutility of effort. r is 
a random variable with a zero mean and a probability distribution f(r). r and k are supposed to 
be independent random variables. Let )(
HerF  and )(
LerF
 
be the cumulative distribution 
functions of company stock return conditional on high level of effort e
H
 and low level of 
effort e
L
, we assume )(
HerF  < )(
LerF . Therefore, the employee’s effort is productive in 
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. The effort is personally costly to the employee 
that endures )(e  the disutility that is increasing with effort. Employee’s initial wealth Ws is 
totally invested in a risk free asset whose rate of return is r0. If employee ownership is 
granted, employee’s wealth increases by an amount cWs of company stock.  
The return of company stock is then )1( ,kjr   for a level of effort j={H,L} and for 
different managers’ types k={G,B}. According to managers’ type and employees’ effort, the 
conditional means of the conditional distributions of the return take the following values: 
L,B = , L,G =  + , H,B =  +  , H,G =  +  +  , with  > 0,  > 0,  > 0. 
The entrepreneur’s and employee’s outcomes at the end of the game depend on the strategies 
they adopt. If, at some period of the game, one of the players decides to not participate, their 
expected utility at the end of the game is null. The agents’ expected utilities at the end of the 
game depend on the manager’ quality (G or B), on the level of employee ownership (c) and 
on the agent’s level of effort (H or L). Let’s denote kjiV ,, the manager expected utility if a 
contribution i={0,c} is granted, a level of effort j={H,L} is implemented according to his type 
k={G,B}. The risk neutral manager maximizes the expected value of his wealth V
0 ,j,k
 or V
c,j,k
 
depending on whether c is granted or not: 
 

V 0, j,k  Wd (1 r  
j,k ) f (r)dr Wd (1 
j,k)


  (1) 
 

V c, j,k  (Wd  cW s)(1 r  
j,k) f (r)dr  (Wd  cW s)(1 
j,k )


  (2) 
With c = 0 and c > 0, respectively, the expected utility of the employee is: 
 

U0, j  u[Ws(1 r0)](e
j )  (3) 
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
U c, j  {p0u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  
j,G )] (1 p0)u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  
j,B )]} f (r)


 dr (e j )
 (4) 
where u(.) is a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. 
 
4. Derivation of the employee ownership contracts 
 
4.1. Optimal contract 
First, we characterize an equilibrium of the game without a minimum constraint on company’ 
return. A minimum constraint is introduced in the next sub-section. 
 
Assumption 1: The employee is risk averse and cautious
4
. 
 

x : u'(x)  0,u' '(x)  0,RRA(x)  x
u' '(x)
u'(x)
1
 
(A1) 
This hypothesis implies: 
 

x,[xu'(x)]' 0 (5) 
 
Assumption 2: The employee’s expected utility is strictly positive when company stock is 
not granted, and effort is low: 
 

U0,L  u[Ws(1 r0)](e
L )  0 (A2) 
 
Assumption 3: The employee’s expected utility is higher with employee ownership for a 
given level of effort: 
 

U c, j  {p0u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  
j,G )] (1 p0)u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  
j,B )]}



f (r)dr (e j ) U 0, j  u[Ws(1 r0)](e
j ),c  0,j  H,L
 (A3) 
 
Lemma 1: The relation defined by (c) = Uc,H – Uc,L = (eH) – (eL) has the following 
properties: ω(0) = 0, and ’(c) > 0. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
                                                 
4 See Gollier (2008). 
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Proposition 1: Without the constraint on the value V, under assumptions 1 to 3, for 

1[(eH )(eL )] ck,k G,B  there exists a unique 

c* (0,ck ], where 

ck :
Wd
Ws
H ,k L,k
1 H ,k
 0 , which is the Perfect Subgame Nash Equilibrium, for j = H, and 
k = {G, B}. Furthermore, c* is given by the following relation: 

(c*) (eH )(eL )  
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates propositions 1 and 2. The manager selects the minimum level of c that 
insures a high level of effort at the intersection of ω(c) and )()( LH ee   . Indeed, the 
higher the amount of company stock, the lower the entrepreneur’s wealth Vc,i,j. The additional 
disutility bore by the employee due to a higher effort is exactly compensated by a 
supplementary utility of wealth. Figure 2 shows that the difference between the two levels of 
disutility of effort cannot be compensated above kc . Beyond kc , employee ownership 
becomes too costly to the entrepreneur.  
 
Remark 1:  
 

cG 
Wd
Ws

1   
 cB 
Wd
Ws

1    (6)
 
The two threshold constraints differ according to the two types of managers who know their 
type G or B whereas the employee cannot observe it. 
 
FIGURE 2: DETERMINATION OF THE OPTIMAL EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP CONTRACTS 
0 c* 
ω(c) 
V c,H 
V c*,H 
c 
)()( LH ee    
Gc    Bc  
cG* cB* 
 
ωB(c) 
ωG(c) 
Vc*,H,B 
V
c*,H,G 
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Notes. Thick lines represent (i) entrepreneur’s wealth Vc,H with the optimal contract; (ii) the maximum thresholds 
of company stock granted Gc  and Bc ; (iii) the difference of employee’s utility wealth due to a high level of 
effort ωk(c). Dash line represents the disutility of effort bore by the employee. 
 
4.2. Revelation of information 
Now, we introduce the condition of a minimum return for the entrepreneur. The equilibrium 
decision is noted c
e
 in the sequel.  
If V < Vm with Vm > 0, the entrepreneur is fired out
5
 and his value is fixed to 0, except if the 
employee’s ownership is greater than or equal to Cm, Cm > 0, or equivalently if  c > cm, with 
cm = Cm/Ws. In the sequel, Wd > Cm. 
(i) If (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) > (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,B
) ≥ Vm, (7) 
then, c
e
 = c*, j = H, and V = V
c*,H,k
 = (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,k
), for k = {G, B}. 
(ii) If Vm > (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) > (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,B
), (8) 
then, c
e
 = Max(c*, cm) j = H, and V = V
ce,H,k
 = (Wd – c
e
 Ws)(1 + 
H,k
), for k = {G, B}. 
(iii) If (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) ≥ Vm > (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,B
), (9) 
(j) for k = G, then, c
e
 = c*, j = H, and V = V
c*,H,G
 = (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
), 
(jj) for k = B, then, c
e
 = Max(c*, cm) j = H, and V = V
ce,H,B
 = (Wd – c
e
 Ws)(1 + 
H,B
). 
 
Remark 2: We have an increase of c for a given level of effort (H), and then a decrease of the 
shareholder value. If c*>cm, the manager chooses to give c*. When c
e
>c*, the manager’s type 
is revealed to the employee. 
 
The case (iii) corresponds to a separating equilibrium since G and B are identified. 
 
Assumption 4: (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) ≥ Vm > (Wd – c* Ws)(1 + 
H,B
), (A4) 
with c* characterized in Proposition 1. 
 
Assumption 4 applies in the sequel. 
The employee observes the value of c*, then, he can identify the type of the manager. In the 
case where cm > c*: 
(j) If c
e
 = c*, then k = G, 
(jj) If c
e
 = cm, then, k = B. 
                                                 
5 This minimum return condition is consistent with the argument of Jensen and Ruback (1983). They argue that 
takeover target firms experience negative abnormal returns in the period prior to their acquisition. 
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The employee adapts his beliefs and then his behavior. Then, his expected utility depends 
now on the type k = {G, B} of the manager: 
 
)()()]1()1([ ,0
,, jkj
ss
kjc edrrfrcWrWuU   

  (10)
 
and the relation (.) becomes k(c) = U
c,H,k
 – Uc,L,k + (eH) – (eL) since the employee is now 
able identify the manager’s type. 
Lemma 2: The relations k(c) have the following properties: ωk(0) = 0, and k’(c) > 0. 
The solutions ck*, for k = {G, B}, of the equations: 

k(ck*) (e
H )(eL )  are such that: cB* < c* < cG *. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
Remark 3: Irrespective of the kc  constraint, a higher amount is required from the good 
manager. 
 
Proposition 2: Under assumptions 1 to 4, for G
LH
G cee 
 )]()([1 
 
- In the case where cm > c*, there exists a unique ck
e
, which is the Perfect Subgame Nash 
Equilibrium, for j = H, and k = {G, B} such that: 
(j) for k = G, 
(i) If (Wd – cG* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) ≥ Vm, cG
e
 = cG*, (11) 
(ii) If (Wd – cG* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) < Vm, , cG
e
 = Max(cG*, cm), (12) 
In (ii), we underlines that the good manager’s wealth can now be below the Vm constraint 
whereas it was not possible with the contract described in the previous section. 
(jj) for k = B, 
(i) If (Wd – cB* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) ≥ Vm, cB
e
 = cB*, (13) 
(ii) If (Wd – cB* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) < Vm, , cB
e
 = cm, (14) 
where 

cG* (0,cG ] and 

cB* (0,cG ] are given by the following relation: 

k(ck*) (e
H )(eL )  for k = G, B. 
- In the case where cm ≤ c*, there exists a unique ],0[* Gcc  , which is the Perfect Subgame 
Nash Equilibrium, for j = H, and k = {G, B}. Furthermore, c* is given by: 

(c*) (eH )(eL )  (15) 
Proof: See the appendix. 
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Remark 4: The revelation of information increases the contribution for k = G, and decreases 
the contribution for k = B, for a given level of effort H. These relations hold when the 
constraint kc  and the revelation of the information have an effect. This conclusion does not 
invalidate the previous findings. Bad managers offer a higher contribution to avoid a layoff. 
Because of the presence of bad managers, the level of the contribution increases. This 
phenomenon can be analyzed as an adverse selection problem where signaling is costly to the 
good managers only because of the presence of bad managers. The employee is always more 
demanding with good managers. This situation occurs because the disutilities of effort 
difference does not depend on manager’s type. Furthermore, the equilibrium is reached when 
this difference is equal to the expected utilities difference. This latter difference is higher for 
good managers (see figure 2). 
 
4.3. Cheating and commitments 
Both managers’ types have an incentive to cheat. The good and the bad managers can 
respectively offer the bad and the good contribution. In this situation, the equilibrium 
conditions do not hold any more. Let’s examine this assertion. When cG* < cm and (Wd – cG* 
Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) ≥ Vm >(Wd – cB* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
), a bad manager has a greater expected profit if he 
offers the good manager’s contribution level cG* instead of cm (see Proposition 2). As for the 
good manager, he has a greater expected profit if he offers the bad manager’s contribution 
level cB* instead of the good one cG* (see Proposition 2), or if he offers cm (as a type B) 
instead of cG* (see Proposition 2) when cG* > cm, or if he offers cB* (as a type B) instead of cm 
(see Proposition 2). These substitutions are valuable in any cases except the case where type B 
has an incentive to cheat, that is when: cG* < cm, and (Wd – cG* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) ≥ Vm >(Wd – cB* 
Ws)(1 + 
H,G
). 
It follows that, in any case, B gives the signal G or G gives the signal B. Both managers’ types 
have an incentive to choose the same behavior and the revelation is no longer possible. But 
this result opens the question of a second round problem: what is the optimal decision in the 
situation where it is possible to cheat? This question is submitted to an infinite regression 
phenomenon and no solution can appear without the introduction of necessarily arbitrary 
meta-believes. 
Another way to solve the problem is to introduce commitments. The level of c can be set 
before the nature chose the manager’s type. His expected value is then: 
V
0,j
 = p0Wd (1 + 
j,G
) +  (1 – p0)Wd (1 + 
j,B
) 
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= Wd [1 + p0
 j,G +  (1 – p0) 
j,B
],  (16) 
or: 
V
c,j
 = p0(Wd – c Ws) (1 + 
j,G
) +  (1 – p0) (Wd – c Ws) (1 + 
j,B
) 
= (Wd – c Ws) [1 + p0
 j,G +  (1 – p0) 
j,B
].  (17) 
 
Proposition 3: Under assumptions A1 to A4, for 

G
1[(eH )(eL )] c
 
there exists an unique ck
e
, which is the Perfect Subgame Nash Equilibrium, for j = H, and 
k = G, B, such that: 
- In the case where cm > c*,  
(i) If 

p0(Wd c *Ws)(1
H ,G)  (Wd cmWs)(1) , ck
e
 = c*, (18) 
(ii) If 

p0(Wd c *Ws)(1
H ,G)  (Wd cmWs)(1) , ck
e
 = cm, (19) 
- In the case where cm ≤ c*: ck
e
 = c*. 
Where c* is given by the following relation: 
 

(c*) (eH )(eL ) , and 


0,
1
p
W
W
c
s
d 


 (20) 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
Remark 5: According to proposition 3, a better compensation policy involving employee 
ownership should be designed before the manager type is known. From a managerial 
perspective, this means that the stockholders in charge of hiring and controlling the manager 
should not leave decisions regarding employee ownership policy to the manager’s discretion. 
Otherwise, our conclusions show that managers are likely to use employee ownership to 
compensate their type. But if such a recommendation applies, employee ownership does not 
allow separating good managers from bad managers any more. 
 
5. Comparative statics 
To illustrate how relational contract can be used, this section provides numerical results of the 
model. The calibration needs the specification of the distributions of company stock returns 
and the employee’s utility function. We take the usual assumption of normality for the 
distribution and a negative exponential utility function. Given the conditions of the perfect 
Nash equilibrium in sub-game expounded in section 4.2 by the proposition 2 and the form of 
the negative exponential utility function, the analytical solution of ck* is given by 
)()()()()( *,*,* LHk
kL
k
kH
kk eecFcFc   , then: 
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
DL,k(ck
*)DH ,k(ck
*) (eH )(eL ), k = {G, B}, where:  
]}
2
)1()1[(exp{)(
22
,
0
,


 skjs
kj WaccraWcD  , with j = {H, L}. (21) 
In Proposition 1, the equilibrium value c* is given by: 

(c*)  [p0F
H ,G(c*) (1 p0)F
H ,B (c*)][p0F
L,G(c*) (1 p0)F
L,B (c*)](eH )(eL ), (22) 

p0[F
H ,G(c*)F L,G(c*)] (1 p0)[F
H ,B (c*)F L,B (c*)](eH )(eL )  (23) 

p0[D
L,G(c*)DH ,G(c*)] (1 p0)[D
L,B (c*)DH ,B (c*)](eH )(eL ) . (24) 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
Traditional comparative statics analysis makes it possible to emphasize several properties of 
the solution. Figure 3 displays the results of the simulations. 
 
Figure 3 (a) displays the positive relationship between p0 and c*. The higher the probability of 
having a good manager is, the higher the amount of company stock granted to the employee. 
In an economy where good managers are more numerous, the employees request a higher 
contribution in company stock according to remark 4. If p0 = 0, c*= 
*
Bc and if p0 = 1, c* = 
*
Gc . 
Figure 3 (b) shows the relationship between α and c*, *Gc  and 
*
Bc . The α parameter makes the 
difference between good and bad managers. Whereas it has no effect on *Bc , it increases the 
value of the contribution *Gc . This result confirms and reinforces the previous conclusion of 
figure 3 (a) and remark 4. As the difference between bad and good managers increases, the 
employees become more demanding and seek to capture a higher proportion of company’s 
wealth. In a situation where the employees think they face good managers, they therefore ask 
a higher amount of company stock. 
Figure 3 (c) displays the positive relationship between μ and c*, *Gc  and 
*
Bc . The μ parameter 
is the company basic stock mean return. As for this chart, the more profitable is the firm, the 
more the employee wants to be compensated with company stock. We also notice a higher 
difference between *Gc  and c* than between 
*
Bc  and c*. This result emphasizes that, for a 
given level of μ, the employees are more sensitive to the company’s performance when the 
company is led by a good manager. 
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Figure 3 (d) displays the negative relationship between σ and c*, *Gc  and 
*
Bc . The σ parameter 
is the company’s returns standard deviation. According to this figure, the riskier is the firm, 
the less the employee wants to be compensated with company stock. We also find the 
comparable difference between  *Gc  and c* than between 
*
Bc  and c* as in figure 3 (c).  
In figures 3 (c) and 3 (d), we cannot draw any conclusion from the relative positions of the 
lines  c*, *Gc  and 
*
Bc . Although we notice that the distance between c* and 
*
Gc  is higher than 
the one between c* and *Bc , these differences are only determined by the value of the 
parameter p0 used in the simulations (i.e. 0,2). Another value would have result in a different 
position on the chart. For instance, if p0 = 0,5, the c* line lies exactly halfway through 
*
Gc  and 
*
Bc .  
Figure 3 (e) displays the negative relationship between β and c*, *Gc  and 
*
Bc . The β parameter 
makes the difference between a high and a low effort exerted by the employee. An increase of 
β denotes an increase of the productivity of effort. According to this chart, this parameter has 
the same negative effect on c*, *Gc  and 
*
Bc . In fact, the employee’s effort does not depend on 
the manager’s type. It remains the same whatever the manager’s type is. But, as the 
productivity of the effort increases, the amount of company stock diminishes. In order to 
obtain the same return associated with a high level of effort, the manager pays the employee 
less because the productivity increases. 
Figure 3 (f) shows the negative relationship between a and c*, *Gc  and 
*
Bc . The a parameter is 
the employee’s absolute risk aversion. This parameter has the same negative effect on c*, *Gc  
and *Bc  because the employee’s risk aversion does not depend on the manager’s type. As the 
employee’s risk aversion increases, he becomes more reluctant to hold risky assets.  
Figure 3 (g) shows the curvilinear relationship between Ws and c*,
*
Gc  and 
*
Bc . The Ws 
parameter measures the employee’s wealth. Considering assumption 3, on can distinguish two 
different effects: a wealth effect due to the value of Ws and a scale effect related to the value 
of kj , . This latter effect is the more difficult to explain since it depends on the values of four 
different parameters i.e. α, μ, β, σ. The two former parameters are positively associated with 
the amount of company stock whereas the two latter are negatively associated with it (see 
figures 3(b) to 3(e)). As far as the increasing part of the curve, it is completely determined by 
the value of the parameter a i.e. the employee’s absolute risk aversion. Indeed, when the 
15 
 
simulation is run with a lower value of a (for instance 0,3), the increasing section of the curve 
disappears. 
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(a) (b) 
 Gc ;  c*;  
*
Bc ; 
*
Gc  
  
(c) (d) 
 Gc ;  c*;  
*
Bc ; 
*
Gc  
Notes.Values of the parameters are: 65,0Gc ; 2,00 p ; 05,00 r  1,0 ; 5,0m  ; 1m  ; 5,7e  ; 2,0em  ; 5,0sW  ; 5dW  ; 6,0a ; 05,0 ; 05,0 ; 
1,0 . 
FIGURE 3: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE OPTIMAL EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP CONTRACTS AND THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL 
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(e) (f) 
 Gc ;  c*;  
*
Bc ; 
*
Gc  
 
(g) 
 Gc ;  c*;  
*
Bc ; 
*
Gc  
Notes.Values of the parameters are: 65,0Gc ; 2,00 p ; 05,00 r  1,0 ; 5,0m  ; 1m  ; 5,7e  ; 2,0em  ; 5,0sW  ; 5dW  ; 6,0a ; 05,0 ; 05,0 ; 
1,0 . **  and *, BG ccc  coincide for panels (e), (f) and (g). 
FIGURE 3 (CONTINUED): RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE OPTIMAL EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP CONTRACTS AND THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL 
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6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we set up a model which regards employees’ compensation in company stock as 
an imperfect signal of management quality. This viewpoint significantly differs from the 
existing literature in behavioral finance. This body of literature assumes that employees invest 
their money in their firm because they consider their employer’s contribution in company 
stock as implicit investment advice. However, employee ownership is often analyzed as an 
entrenchment mechanism by corporate governance literature.  
This paper brings about three main conclusions. Firstly, we show that employee ownership 
can be used by managers to compensate their actual management’s skills. Secondly, we 
demonstrate that higher contributions in company stock as demanded to the good managers 
than to the bad. This situation is similar to an adverse selection problem where the presence of 
bad managers makes it costly to the good managers to signal themselves. But this 
phenomenon comes with another problem since it incentivizes both managers’ type to hide 
their actual type. It is valuable for the bad managers to appear as good ones. Similarly, 
appearing as bad managers can also be profitable to good managers. To solve this problem, 
we introduce commitments which lead us to our third result. Our third main result has a 
normative thrust. In order to prevent managers from hiding their actual type, our model 
suggests that compensation mechanisms involving employee ownership should be defined 
before the manager’s type is known. In other words, managers should not interfere with 
employee ownership policy. The comparative statics section highlights several main results. 
First, in a situation where the employees think they face good managers, they therefore ask a 
higher amount of company stock. Second, for a given level of μ, the employees are more 
sensitive to the company’s performance when the company is led by a good manager. Third, 
as the productivity of the effort increases, the amount of company stock granted to the 
employee decreases. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
 

(c)  {p0u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  
H ,G )] (1 p0)u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  
H ,B )]} f (r)


 dr
 {p0u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  
L,G )] (1 p0)u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  
L,B )]} f (r)


 dr
(25) 
 

(c)  {p0(u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r    )] u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  )])



(1 p0)(u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r   )] u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  )])} f (r)dr
 (26) 
We have first ω(0) = 0. For the second property: 
 

'(c)  {p0(Ws(1 r     )u'[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r     )]



Ws(1 r   )u'[Ws(1 r0)  cW s(1 r   )])
(1 p0)(Ws(1 r    )u'[Ws(1 r0)  cW s(1 r    )]
Ws(1 r  )u'[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  )])} f (r)dr
 (27) 
Let  

X :Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r    )
Y :Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r   )
Z :Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r    )
T :Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  )
 
Replacing X, Y, Z, and T in equation (8) gives: 
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
'(c)  {p0[
X Ws(1 r0)
c
u'(X)


 
Y Ws(1 r0)
c
u'(Y )]
(1 p0)[
Z Ws(1 r0)
c
u'(Z)
T Ws(1 r0)
c
u'(T)]} f (r)dr
 (28) 
 

'(c) 
1
c
{p0[Xu'(X)Yu'(Y)] (1 p0)[Zu'(Z)Tu'(T)]



Ws(1 r0)(p0[u'(Y) u'(X)] (1 p0)[u'(T) u'(Z)])} f (r)dr
 (29) 
Under hypothesis A1, and with:  r, X > Y, and Z > T, we have: 
 r, u’(Y) > u’(X), u’(T) > u’(Z), Xu’(X) ≥ Yu’(Y), Zu’(Z) ≥ Tu’(T), and then ’(c) > 0.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1. A Perfect Subgame Nash Equilibrium (V
c,H
, U
c,H
), with c > 0, must 
satisfy the following conditions: 
The manager plays 0c  if Vc,H ≥ V0,L and Vc,H ≥ 0. 
The employee chooses the level of effort k = H if U
c,H
 ≥ Uc,L and Uc,H ≥ 0. 
First, by assumption 2, when c = 0, the expected utility of employee is strictly positive with 
the level of effort j = L, and strictly greater than the value obtained with  j = H, because 
(eH) > (eL) > 0. Therefore, participation of the employee in the firm is optimal. Then, 
U
c,H
 ≥ Uc,L and Uc,L ≥ U0,L (by assumption 3), implies Uc,H ≥ 0. 
Second, the entrepreneur’s exit cannot be an equilibrium because, V0,L is always possible, as it 
is stated in the first point, and it is strictly positive. Then, V
c,H
 ≥ V0,L implies Vc,H ≥ 0. 
Third, with 

(c*) (eH )(eL ) , and the lemma 1, the condition 

1[(eH )(eL )] ck,k G,B , implies 

c* ck . Furthermore, 
 

c* ck :
Wd
Ws
H ,k L,k
1 H ,k
 (Wd  c *Ws)(1 
H ,k ) Wd (1 
L,k )V c*,H ,k V 0,L,k
 (30)
 
and then, we have: V
c*,H,k
 ≥ V0,L,k, for any k. 
Fourth, U
c,H
 ≥ Uc,L is equivalent to 

(c) (eH )(eL )
 
This characterize a positive Perfect Subgame Nash Equilibrium c*, with an equality in the 
preceding relation. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. The properties of the functions k(c) result of a straightforward adaptation 
of the proof of Lemma 1. 
Furthermore, 

G(c)  {u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r    )] u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  )]} f (r)


 dr
(31)
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
B (c)  {u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r   )] u[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  )]} f (r)


 dr
 (32)
 
Let  

X :Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r   )
Y :Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 r  )
a : cW s
 

G (c)  [u(X  a) u(Y  a)] f (r)


 dr
 

B (c)  [u(X) u(Y)] f (r)


 dr
 
with X > Y.
 
As u(.) is a strictly concave function, for any r, and for any strictly positive a, 
u(X + a) – u(Y + a) < u(X) – u(Y), and then, G(c) < B(c), for any positive c. 
With (c) = p0 G(c) + (1 – p0) B(c), and the preceding equation, we have: 
cB* < c* < cG*. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, when cm ≤ c*, with the condition 

G
1[(eH )(eL )] cG , the 
inequalities  

cG  cB  and cB* < c* < cG* (Lemma 2), without revelation, the equilibrium is 
obtained as in Proposition 1. 
Second, when cm > c*, cG* and cB* are defined as c* in Proposition 1, with G(.) and B(.) 
instead of (.). Their existence is satisfied with respect to Lemma 2 and the inequalities stated 
in the first point. 
(j) for k = G, 
(i) If (Wd – cG* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) ≥ Vm, cG
e
 = cG*, 
(ii) If (Wd – cG* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) < Vm, , cG
e
 = Max(cG*, cm). 
(jj) for k = B, 
(i) If (Wd – cB* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) ≥ Vm, cB
e
 = cB*, 
(ii) If (Wd – cB* Ws)(1 + 
H,G
) < Vm, , cB
e
 = Max(cB*, cm) = cm. 
 
Proof of proposition 3. First, the condition V
c,H
 ≥ V0,L  is now: 
 

c  c :
Wd
Ws
p0(
H ,G L,G ) (1 p0)(
H ,B L,B )
1 p0
H ,G  (1 p0)
H ,B

Wd
Ws

1 
,    p0
 (33) 
Second, when cm > c*, for c = c*, the expected value of the entrepreneur is: 
V
c*,H
 = p0(Wd – c* Ws) (1 + 
H,G
), 
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and for c = cm, the expected value of the entrepreneur is: 

V cm ,H  (Wd cmWs)(1 ) . 
Then, if V
c*,H
 ≥ Vcm,H, the optimal choice is c*, and if Vc*,H < Vcm,H the optimal choice is cm. 
Third, if cm ≤ c*, the optimal choice is c*. 
These results are a direct adaptation of Proposition 1 and 2. 
 
Application with a negative exponential utility function 
This function is defined up to a positive linear transformation: u(w) =  v(w) + , and must 
satisfy the following normalization
6
: u(0) = 0. Then,  = , and, without lost of generality, we 
take  = 1. Therefore, in the sequel, the utility is7: u(w) = 1 – exp(– aw). 
Let: 

F j,k (c) : u[Ws(1 r0) cWs(1 r  
j,k)] f (r)dr


 , (34) 
and we suppose that f(.) is a centered normal density with variance 2. Then: 

F j,k (c) : f (r)dr


  f j,k(r;c)dr


 1 f j,k(r;c)dr


 , 
where: 

f j,k (r;c) : exp{a[Ws(1 r0) cWs(1 r  
j,k)]}
1
 2
exp 
r2
2 2





 

f j,k (r;c) 
1
 2
exp{a[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 
j,k )]}exp(acW sr)exp 
r2
2 2





. (35) 
Let us define: 

D j,k (c) :
f j,k (r;c)
(x)
, where (x) is a normal density with mean mx and variance x
2
, 

D j,k (c)(x)  D j,k (c)
1
 x 2
exp 
(x mx)
2
2 x
2





 
 

D j,k (c)(x)  D j,k (c)
1
 x 2
exp 
mx
2
2 x
2





exp
xmx
 x
2





exp 
x 2
2 x
2





 f
j,k(r;c). (36) 
An identification term by term of this last relation, for x = r, leads to: 
x = , mx = – a c Ws 
2
, and 
                                                 
6 Because U = 0 when the employee exert his exit option (see §1). 
7 Assumption A1 restrict the domain studied to a w ≤ 1. 
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
D j,k (c) 
exp{a[Ws(1 r0) cW s(1 
j ,k )]}
exp 
(acW s
2)2
2 2






 (37)
 

D j,k (c)  exp{aWs[(1 r0) c(1 
j,k)
ac2Ws
2
2
]}. 
We have: 

F j,k (c) 1 f j,k (r;c)dr


 1D j,k (c) (x)dx


 1D j,k(c) . (38) 
